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A regulatory agency enforcing compliance in a declining industry might 
recognize that certain plants would close rather than comply, and that these 
closings would impose large costs on the local community.  EPA enforcement 
activity in the U.S.  steel industry is examined for evidence of this result. 
A three-equation system linking EPA enforcement decisions, company 
plant-closing decisions, and company compliance decisions is estimated.  The 
results indicate that the EPA directed fewer enforcement actions toward plants 
with a high predicted probability of closing and plants that were major 
employers in their community; also, plants predicted to face relatively heavy 
enforcement were more likely to close. 
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Critics of U.S. pollution-control policies frequently complain that the 
government pursues the benefits of reduced pollution without fully considering 
'the costs.  While much attention has focused on the inefficiency of the EPA's 
technology-based regulations, which ignore the potential cost savings of 
allowing f  inns to equalize marginal abatement costs,  a more politically 
explosive issue concerns the potential trade-offs between pollution control 
and jobs.  A firm's  decision to curtail or discontinue operations at a plant 
can impose substantial adjustment costs on the local community, including lost 
taxes and reduced income for local residents.  A regulator might consider 
these costs as part of the total cost of pollution reduction, and allocate 
enforcement efforts so as to reduce these costs to local communities.  2 
In this paper, we examine EPA activity at U.S. steel plants during the 
years 1977-1986 for evidence that the EPA's  enforcement activity was 
responsive to measures of the possible economic disruption from plant 
closings.  During this period, the EPA faced the problem of enforcing new, 
higher air-quality standards on an industry that was a major polluter, but was 
also undergoing severe contraction.  We estimate a simultaneous system of EPA 
enforcement decisions and company plant-closing decisions to test the 
hypothesis that the EPA directed less enforcement activity toward plants that 
were likely to close, or that were located where a closing would generate 
higher-than-average adjustment costs. 
We model the regulator as wishing to reduce steel industry pollution at 
minimum cost, including local adjustment costs.  Expected local adjustment 
costs depend on the probability that the plant will close, and on the amount 
of local disruption that will occur if the plant does close.-  Firms, in turn, 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy1  must decide which plants to close during the contraction, and they include 
I 
/  their prediction of future enforcement activity by the EPA in their 
assessments of future plant profits. 
We round out the system with a third equation modeling company decisions 
about whether to comply with pollution regulations at a plant, because several 
researchers have found a relationship between enforcement and compliance.  4 
We follow Bartel and Thomas  (1985)  by including an equation for this decision, 
though in our case a firm's  decision to comply is likely to be subordinate to 
its decision about whether to close the plant. 
We estimate our three-equation model using data on 49 plants, which 
together represented virtually all the capacity of the U.S.  integrated steel 
industry in 1976.  The steel industry has several characteristics that 
/  increase the likelihood of observing EPA sensitivity to potential adjustment 
costs.  First, the industry produces a great deal of pollution, forcing the 
EPA to take some action toward it.6  Second, the industry contracted sharply 
during the test period:  of the 49 plants in our sample, 21 closed by 1987. 
Third, steel plants employ large amounts of workers, increasing local 
adjustment costs. 
In  Section I1 we discuss the model of EPA activity and company 
plant-closing and compliance decisions.  We explain the econometric 
is enacted.  Assume further that one of the major polluters is an industry 
specification used in Section 111, and'give  a brief description of the data 
I 
1  set in Section IV.  The results are discussed in Section V, and Section VI is  I 
the conclusion. 
1  11.  Model 
!' 
t 
i  Assume that new anti-pollution legislation raising air-quality  standards 
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enforcement decision in this situation, and then company plant-closing and 
-  compliance decisions. 
The Enforcement Decision 
We assume the regulator maximizes net marginal social benefit, and thus 
that enforcement activity is a function of the benefits and costs of pollution 
control.  The social benefit of regulating air pollution at steel plants comes 
from reducing the pollution they produce.  Thus, other things being equal, 
regulators will create more social benefit by enforcing compliance at plants 
emitting higher levels of pollution. 
This benefit will vary from place to place, however, depending on local 
conditions:  other things being equal, the benefit from reducing pollution 
will be greater in a more heavily polluted area.  Further, the benefits from 
enforcement at a plant will also vary according to whether the plant is 
already in compliance.  The return on additional enforcement pressure will be 
lower at those plants already in compliance, or those more likely to be 
brought into compliance. 
We model the total social cost of pollution enforcement in two parts. The 
first part consists of the cost to firms, in extra investment, increased 
operating costs, and reduced productivity, of complying with regulations.  As 
previous authors have noted, the net social benefit of pollution control is 
maximized if the EPA enforces regulations so as to equalize marginal abatement 
costs. 
The second part of the total social cost is the adjustment cost 
experienced by the local community if a plant closes rather than comply with 
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unemployed workers, their unemployment insurance payments, and the resources 
required by local communities to adjust (downward) the provision of such 
services as police and fire protection.8  If regulatory enforcement behavior 
might lead to some plant closings, regulators might direct their enforcement 
toward plants for which the social cost of closing is lower.  9 
In summary, the regulatory agency enforces compliance across plants so as 
to maximize the difference between the benefits and costs of pollution 
reduction.  The benefits of enforcing pollution regulations depend on the 
amount of pollution plants produce, on the probability that they will be 
brought into compliance, and on local pollution levels.  The costs of 
enforcement depend on the adjustment costs of local communities associated 
with a plant closing, as well as on the increase in company production costs. 
The Plant-Closing Decision 
The challenge to firms in a declining industry is to minimize their losses 
by closing those plants with the lowest expected net revenues.  Thus, plants 
with the lowest expected revenue and the highest expected production costs, as 
as well as the oldest capital stock, should be closed.  10 
However, a firm must also consider the cost of complying with pollution 
regulations when ranking plants by expected net revenues.  The cost of 
bringing a plant into full compliance will depend on the type of machinery 
already in place at the plant.  The higher this cost, the lower the expected 
net revenues that will be earned by the plant, making a firm more likely to 
close it. 
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a firm expects to encounter at each plant.  Other things being equal, plants 
expected to face more enforcement pressure will need to spend more for 
pollution control.  Plants facing higher expected enforcement activity will 
have higher expected compliance costs, and thus lower expected net revenues; 
such plants are more likely to close. 
Similarly, firms will be less likely to close plants that are already in 
compliance or easy to bring into compliance, perhaps because of past 
investment decisions or because of differences in local county regulations. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the probability of a plant being in compliance 
should be inversely related to the probability of a plant being closed. Thus, 
firms minimize their losses by closing plants with the lowest expected net 
revenues, the oldest capital, the highest expected compliance costs, and the 
lowest probability of being in compliance.  Firms are more likely to close 
plants where more enforcement is expected to occur, since enforcement is 
likely to raise compliance costs. 
T-h 
In a declining industry, a firm's  decision as to whether to bring a plant 
into full compliance may well be subsidiary to its decision about whether to 
close the plant.  Nevertheless, we include a third equation in the model 
because, as stated above, enforcement decisions are likely to be influenced by 
whether a plant is in compliance or being brought into compliance in a timely 
manner.  In turn, compliance may well be affected by expected enforcement, 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyparticularly among plants that will remain open.  Other things being equal, a 
greater degree of compliance should be observed in plants expected to 
encounter more enforcement pressure. 
A  firm's  decision about whether to bring a plant into compliance is 
closely tied to the firm's plant-closing decision:  the cost of compliance, 
measured in dollars per ton of steel shipped,  will be much higher for a plant 
that will soon close,  giving a firm little incentive to bring it into 
compliance before shutting it down.  Thus,  we include the plant-closing 
decision as a determinant of the compliance decision, and expect that, other 
things being equal, we will observe less compliance at plants more likely to 
close. 
Finally,  holding expected enforcement constant,  a firm's  decision will 
also be affected by the expenditure required to bring a plant into full 
compliance.  Compliance costs will vary across plants if each plant requires 
different control equipment,  or if productivity losses differ.  Ceteris 
paribus,  a plant with higher compliance costs is less likely to be brought 
into compliance than one with lower costs. 
Therefore, the firm's  compliance decision depends on expected enforcement, 
on the probability of the plant closing, and on the amount of expenditure that 
would be necessary to bring the plant into full compliance. 
111.  Econometric Snecification 
8 
We have developed a system with three endogenous variables:  EPA 
enforcement at a plant, the owning firm's  decision whether to close the plant, 
and the firm's  decision whether to bring the plant into compliance.  These 
decisions are linked in our model for three reasons.  First, enforcement at a 
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and on the probability that it will bring the plant into compliance.  Second, 
the   rob ability of a plant being closed depends on the expected level of 
enforcement and on the ease with which the plant can be brought into 
compliance.  Third, compliance depends on whether the plant is likely to be 
closed and on the expected enforcement faced by the plant. 
We estimate the system using a two-stage, instrumental variables method, 
instead of a more efficient full-information, maximum-likelihood estimator, 
because the enforcement equation has a continuous dependent variable and is 
estimated with panel data, while the other two equations have dichotomous 
dependent variables and are estimated with cross-section data.  We use the 
first-stage equations to generate predicted values for each decision, and then 
use the predicted values as instruments in the second-stage  (structural) 
equations. In the first-stage estimations, the plant closing and compliance 
probabilities are estimated using logit models, while an ordinary regression 
model is used for the enforcement decision.  All equations include a number of 
variables that are fixed for each plant:  its location, product mix, size, the 
age of its capital in 1976, the amount of emissions it produces, and the cost 
of bringing the plant into full compliance.  All equations also include the 
plant's  employment relative to the size of its local labor market, which is 
measured in 1976 for the cross-sectional equations, and annually for the 
panel.  The enforcement equation also includes year dummies and local 
unemployment rates.  11 
Two final adjustments are required to generate a full set of instruments 
.  .. 
for the second-stage equations.  First, compliance data were unavailable for 
four plants.  We estimate the first-stage compliance equation using the 45 
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generate predicted compliance for all 49 plants. 
Second, when a firm decides to close a plant, no more enforcement is 
directed toward that plant, potentially skewing the enforcement measure in the 
plant-closing and compliance equations.  Also, the information about 
enforcement over time must be compressed into a single number for the 
cross-section estimations.  We use the estimated enforcement equation to 
predict the log of enforcement in all years for every plant, including those 
that closed during the sample period, and use the sum of the predicted logs of 
enforcement. 
The first-stage estimations, and the additional adjustments, yield the 
instruments:  PCLOSE, the predicted probability of closing; PCOMPLY, the 
predicted probability of compliance; and PLENFSUM, the sum of the predicted 
logs of enforcement activity.  We now discuss the structural equations in 
which these variables are used. 
Enforcement 
We use the following specification for the enforcement equation: 
(1)  LENPI  ,,  -  f  (=ITi , ATTAINi, PCOMPLYi  , PCIBSEi  , LREWi,  t  , CNMIi,  t, 
COKPCAPi, YEAR dummies, STATE dummies), 
where i indexes plants and t indexes time.  The dependent variable, LXNF, is 
the log of the number of enforcement actions directed toward the plant each 
12  year by agencies regulating air pollution. 
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of the tons of pollutants emitted by a plant, reflecting the potential 
benefits from enforcement at the plant.  ATTAIN is a dummy variable indicating 
that the plant is  located in an area that has already met its air-quality 
standards; it controls for the lower marginal social benefit of reducing 
pollution in such areas.  PCOMPLY, the predicted probability that the plant 
will be in compliance, indicates whether further enforcement is likely to 
induce additional compliance.  We expect the coefficient on LEHIT to be 
positive, with the other two negative. 
We use four variables to measure the cost of the compliance that 
enforcement is designed to produce.  Three variables model the potential local 
adjustment costs that are the focus of this paper:  PCmSE  is the predicted 
probability that the plant will close sometime during the sample period, 
indicating whether the plant is "near the borderlinen of being closed; LRELEMP 
is the log of the ratio of employment at the plant to employment in the local 
labor market; and CNTYU, the local area unemployment rate, captures the 
difficulty that laid-off workers might have in finding their next job.  We add 
a fourth variable, COMPCAP, the cost  (per  ton of capacity) of bringing the 
plant into full compliance, to control for the compliance costs paid directly 
by the firm.  All four variables are expected to have negative coefficients. 
Finally, the enforcement effort directed toward a particular plant depends 
on the total amount of enforcement being carried out  (or at least being 
recorded) during each year in each state.13  Equation  (1)  controls for 
variation in regulation over time and across states with YEAR and STATE 
dummies.  But, with data on only 45 plants in 15 states, the  state dummies 
could greatly reduce the explanatory power of the other plant-specific 
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STATE dummies with a single variable, LSTATEAV, which measures the total 
enforcement done in a state during a year.  This has the advantage of picking 
up changes in enforcement within each state over time as well as controlling 
for variation across states. 
Plant Closing 
To estimate the probability that a plant will close, we start with the 
model of steel company plant-closing decisions from Deily (1988),  in which the 
expected net revenue of a steel plant depends solely on its individual 
characteristics.14  We augment this model with a more detailed consideration 
of the regulatory environment, using the following specification: 
where i indexes plants. The dependent variable, CLOSE, is dichotomous, 
equalling one for those plants that closed by the end of 1987, and zero for 
those that remained open. 
The first two variables are proxies for a plant's  expected long-run 
revenues, based on the competition faced by the plant.  COAST is a dummy 
variable indicating plants that are located on the coast, facing more import 
competition.  SHAPES measures the percent of a plant's  product mix comprised 
of products also made by minimills, another source of competition.  The 
coefficients of both variables should be positive. 
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controls for variation among plants in age of capital stock.  LCAP, the annual 
steel producing capacity of the plant,  controls for scale economies in steel 
production.  The coefficients of both variables should be negative. 
The final three variables are related to the costs the plant will face in 
complying with EPA regulations.  COMPCAP, the cost of fully complying with 
pollution regulations,  controls for variation in potential expenditures for 
pollution control.  P.LENFSUM,  the sum of predicted logs of enforcement for the 
plant, measures the pressure to comply that the plant is expected to face. 
PCOMPLY is the predicted probability of the plsnt being in compliance.  The 
coefficient on PCOMPLY should be negative,  while COMPCAP and PLENFSUM should 
have positive coefficients. 
Com~liance 
The third equation is the firm's decision about whether to bring a plarit 
into compliance,  and is specified as follows: 
The dependent variable, COMPLY, is a dummy measuring whether the plant has 
been brought into full compliance. 
PLENFSUM,  the sum of expected enforcement activity directed toward the 
plant during the sample period, indicates the pressures or1  the plant to 
comply.  PCIOSE,  the ?redicced probability chac the plant will close, reflects 
the willingness of the firm to  irlvest in corupLiance zc the plant. COMPCAP is 
included co capc:Lxt:  ~i!s  cost or coll~ing inco compliarlcs.  Finally, LCAP, the 
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pollution control that may exist.  The coefficients of PLENFSUM and LCAP are 
expected to be positive,  while the others should be negative. 
IV.  Data 
The basic cross-section sample consists of 49 steelmaking plants owned by 
the integrated producers listed by the Institute for Iron and Steel Studies 
(IISS,  1977),  plus the Portsmouth,  Ohio,  plant of Cyclops.  In this section, 
we first describe the data used for the three endogenous variables,  and then 
the data used for the ten exogenous variables. 
Data on  plant-level enforcement activity comes from the EPA's  Compliance 
Data System  (CDS).  l6  The EPA uses the CDS to track enforcement actions and 
compliance status for major sources of pollution.  l7  The CDS data include all 
enforcement  actions directed toward the plant, and the number of actions 
directed toward the plant during a particular year is the principle measure of 
enforcement activity.  18 
We used two versions of the CDS as sources, one from early 1983 and the 
other from early 1987.  The earlier data set is needed because plants are 
sometimes removed from the CDS after they close; several plants would have had 
to be dropped from the sample if only the later CDS data had been used.  Of 
the 49 plants in the sample, only three are not found on either data set  (two 
were closed in 1976, the other in 1978). 
We also used the CDS data to develop the compliance measure,  since each 
CDS contains a history of the compliance status of the plant over the previous 
. - 
eight quarters.  Unfortunately for our purposes,  we do not observe a 
well-defined,  permanent decision to comply.  Plants can come into compliance 
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future.  This leads to substantial movement in and out of compliance each 
quarter, as plants fail to meet previous compliance agreements and renegotiate 
new ones.  We take the earliest year of compliance data available, 1981, and 
consider a plant to be out of compliance if it was out of compliance for two 
or more quarters of that year.19  In all, 16 of 45 plants, representing 36 
percent of the sample, were in compliance in 1981. 
We defined a plant as "closed" when its steelmaking furnaces were shut 
down.  In addition, three plants that experienced capacity reductions of over 
65 percent were also included as closed plants.  In  all, 21 plants, 
representing 43 percent of the sample, closed during the period. 
Necessary data for the exogenous variables include information about a 
plant's  emissions, whether it is located in an attainment area, the cost of 
bringing it into compliance, the average level of enforcement in the state 
where the plant is located, plant employment relative to local employment, 
local unemployment, plant location, product mix, size, and the age of its 
capital stock.  We discuss the data used in that order. 
The National Emissions Data System (NEDS)  is used by the EPA to track 
pollutant emissions by major stationary sources of air pollution.  As with the 
CDS data, we use two versions of the NEDS, the end-of-year tapes from 1981 and 
1985, so that information on those plants that were taken off the system 
before 1985 because of closing would be included.  Again, all but three plants 
in the sample are on at least one of the NEDS data sets  (the  missing plants 
closed in 1976, 1978 and 1979). 
The two NEDS data sets include the amount of a plant's  emissions of five 
major pollutants, three of which were regularly present for steel plants 
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contain emissions data on these pollutants, giving us up to four possible 
measures of plant-level emissions for each pollutant. 
Three or four emission values for each pollutant were available for most 
plants.  Since these values varied substantially across the four data sets, we 
selected the median of the available values for each pollutant, which gave us 
three measures of emissions at each plant.  The three different pollutants had 
similar magnitudes.  Consequently, for want of a better way of combining them, 
we summed up the three values to get a single measure of the pollution 
generated by the plant.  2  0 
The 1986 CDS indicates whether a plant is in an air quality control region 
that is attaining its standards for each of the major air pollutants. Because, 
according to the database, these standards are rarely achieved, we say that a 
plant is located in an "attainment" area if the area is attaining the 
standards for any of the three major pollutants.  Even so, only seven plants 
were located in an attainment area. 
The cost of full compliance is calculated for each plant using estimates 
in Temple, Barker and Sloane  (1982)  of the total cost to the industry of 
bringing each major piece of equipment into full compliance by 1984.  For 
each type of equipment, we took the total expected capital cost through 1985, 
and divided it by the gross capacity expected to exist in 1985 to get a 
cost-per-unit annual capacity. 
Next, we collected data on the actual equipment in each plant, circa 1976, 
and its capacity (as  near to 1976 as was possible to obtain).  The cost of 
full compliance for a plant was then calculated as the cost per ton of 
capacity times annual capacity, summed over the different pieces of equipment 
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dollars.  This last figure was  then divided by  plant capacity in 1976  to get 
compliance cost per ton of  plant capacity. 
Average  state-level enforcement  rates were  calculated from  the CDS  data as 
the total number  of  enforcement actions in the state, minus  the number  of 
enforcement  actions directed toward the particular plant, divided by  the 
number  of  all other plants on  the CDS  for that state. 
Information on  the local labor market comes  from  the Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics publication, Ern~lovment  and Unem~lovment in States and  Local Areas, 
in annual editions from 1976-1986.  Labor  market  tightness is measured by  the 
unemployment  rate in the county where  the plant is located. 22  The  size of  the 
local labor market is measured  by  the number  of  people employed  in the county. 
Employment  at the plant is taken from  the 1975-1976,  1979-1980  and 
1981-1982  issues of Marketine Economics.  Kev  Plants.  The  numbers  in an issue 
were  assumed  to refer to the first year of  the issue  (i.e., 1975,  1979  and 
1981), and  the remaining years of  the sample  were  interpolated, with the 1981 
value used for 1981-86. 
Plants located on or near .the East, West  or Gulf  coasts have  a value of 
one  for the dummy  variable COAST;  all others have  a value of  zero.  The 
variable, SHAPES,  is the percentage of  hot-rolled capacity for producing 
plates, structural shapes and pilings, or hot-rolled bars and bar shapes.  The 
hot-rolling capacity data is from  the early 19609,  the last time  that detailed 
product data were  published.  A  plant's size is its annual  raw-steel capacity 
in 1976  (IISS, 1977;  IISS, 1979). 
The  percentage of  new  (post-1959) capacity in each of  four major 
departments  (coke-making,  blast furnace,  steel furnace,  and  primary 
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number of these departments the plant operated.  Thus, the figure is the 
percent of the plant that is  "new,"  adjusted for the number of departments 
within the plant and for the amount of replacement within a department. 
Table 1 presents the means and variances of the data used for each 
independent variable, for the three dependent variables of the first-stage 
estimations, and for the three instruments PCLOSE, PCOMPLY, and PLENFSUM. 
V.  Results 
The results of the first-stage estimations are shown in Table 2.  The 
enforcement equation does well, with several significant variables explaining 
over 45 percent of the variance in  (the  log of) enforcement actions. The 
plant-closing equation also does well, with several variables contributing to 
correctly predict 82 percent of the plant-closing decisions.  The compliance 
equation is disappointing, however, with no significant coefficients and 
little explanatory power.  This is probably because of the problems with 
consistently measuring compliance described earlier. 
The second-stage equations are presented in tables 3 and 4.  In general, 
the interactions between the decisions are as expected, although some of the 
exogenous variables offer significant surprises.  We first discuss the 
enforcement equation estimations reported in table 3.  The estimation in 
column 1 includes 14  state dummies to control for variation in state-level 
regulatory behavior, while the estimation in column 2 replaces the dummies 
with the variable LSTATEAV.  The estimations are quite similar, but we prefer 
the more parsimonious model 2, and refer to its results in the following 
discussion. 
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behavior is indeed influenced by potential adjustment costs to local 
communities.  The coefficient of PCLOSE is negative and significant; 
enforcement activity drops by 5 percent for each 10-percentage-point increase 
in the probability of closing.  Further, the coefficient of the variable 
LRELEMP  is also negative and significant, indicating that a 10 percent 
increase in employment size relative to the community work force decreases 
enforcement actions by 2.2 percent. 
The sign of the third variable included to capture variation in potential 
adjustment costs, CNTYLI, has an estimated coefficient that is positive and 
significant.  This indicates that plants in countries with high unemployment 
receive more enforcement actions, rather than less as we expected. We 
investigate this result further by adding an interaction term, PCWSE*CNTYU, 
to the enforcement equation, and re-estimating  (column  3).  The coefficient on 
the interacted term is negative and significant, while the coefficient of 
PCLOSE becomes positive and significant, indicating that the plant-closing 
effects on enforcement decisions are concentrated in counties with high 
unemployment. 
Regulators seem to be "skewingn their enforcement more in these counties 
than in other areas, with greater enforcement on average, but much less for 
the plants that are in danger of closing.  Specifically, increases in county 
unemployment'reduce enforcement activity when the probability of a plant's 
closing exceeds 89 percent.  Stated differently, increases in the probability 
of  closing reduce enforcement activity only when county unemployment exceeds 
7.2  percent. 
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high rate of unemployment are also high population areas, then the public-good 
nature of air pollution control may increase the benefits from reducing 
emissions in such areas relative to less populous locations.  In addition, it 
is  likely that more variation in pollution levels exists than we control for 
with the variable ATTAIN.  If areas of high unemployment are also the most 
polluted areas (e.g., the "rust beltw),  then again the benefits of pollution 
reduction would be greater relative to other areas.  23 
The other variables in the enforcement equation hold few surprises.  Of 
the variables that proxy expected benefits of enforcement, the coefficient on 
LEMIT is positive and always significant, indicating that a plant producing 10 
percent more emissions will receive 2.1  percent more enforcement activity. 
The coefficients of ATTAIN and PCOMPLY are negative as expected, but not 
significant.  COMPCAP's  negative coefficients, though insignificant, support 
the perception that regulators pay little attention to abatement costs. 
LSTATEAV1s  coefficient is significant and close to one, indicating it measures 
overall shifts in enforcement affecting all plants proportionally. 
Estimation results for the plant-closing equation, presented in column 1 
on table 4,  reveal that firms are more likely to close plants that are 
expected to face more enforcement in the future:  the estimated coefficient on 
PLENFSUM, which is positive and significant, indicates that a 10 percent 
increase in the enforcement index increases the probability of closing by 4.3 
percentage points.  Thus, regulatory activity does seem to affect which plants 
are closed. 
.. - 
The coefficient on the variable PCOMPLY is also negative, suggesting that 
plants that are more likely to be in compliance are also less likely to close, 
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variables indicate that small coastal'plants  with older capital are 
significantly more likely to close.  The negative coefficient on compliance 
costs is surprising, but not significant.  24 
The second-stage compliance equation, like the first-stage one, explains 
very little about compliance.  Virtually all of the signs are the opposite of 
what was expected, and none of the coefficients are significant. 
VI.  Conclusions and Future Work 
The evidence presented here indicates that air-pollution regulators did 
allocate their enforcement activity as if they wanted to reduce local 
adjustment costs.  Plants with a higher probability of closing experienced 
less enforcement pressure.  This result was concentrated on  plants located in 
counties with unemployment rates exceeding 7.2  percent.  Further, plants that 
were major employers in their local labor market also encountered less 
enforcement activity. 
Our results also show that company plant-closing decisions during this 
period of drastic industry decline were influenced by the enforcement activity 
of regulators.  Plants predicted to face more enforcement were more likely to 
close.  This suggests that regulatory enforcement did impose costs on the 
plants involved. 
This pattern of enforcement, with stronger plants bearing more of the 
costs, reinforces previous work indicating that the regulatory burden has been 
heavier in faster-growing, high-employment regions.  Thus, regulatory agencies 
. - 
appear to be sensitive to the "ability to pay" of those they regulate. 
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because of the difficulties involved in measuring compliance.  For this 
reason, our future research will include consideration of OSHA enforcement 
decisions, where there are better compliance measures and more clearly 
identified enforcement actions. 
Future research will include examination of a firm's responses to 
regulatory activity on a company-wide basis,  so that we may explore such 
questions as whether similar firms make similar compliance decisions,  whether 
a single firm makes similar compliance decisions for all its plants and for 
different enforcement agencies,  and whether compliance decisions are related 
to the economic health of the firm.  Insight into these matters will ada to 
our understanding of the complex relationship between regulatory and firm 
decision-making processes. 
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1.  Examination of the EPA's technology-based regulations,  which require 
firms to install particular types of equipment, indicates that these 
regulations can be very inefficient  (see  Gollup and Roberts [1985],  and the 
citations listed there).  The EPA has responded with some limited attempts at 
more efficient control methodologies. 
2.  Legislators appear to respond to these potential costs in the way they 
frame regulations  (for  instance,  Crandall,  1983). 
3.  We use EPA in this paper to refer to both the individual state pollution 
agencies and the federal agency.  Much of the enforcement is actually done by 
the state agencies,  under federal EPA supervision. 
4.  Bartel and Thomas  (1985)  model the interaction between OSHA regulatory 
activity and firm behavior with a three-quarter system of injury rates, 
inspections,  and compliance; they find some evidence that these three 
decisions are inter-related.  See also Gray and Jones  (1988)  for evidence that 
repeated OSHA inspections of the same plant find fewer violations on later 
inspections;  Viscusi  (1986)  and Gray and Scholz  (1989)  for evidence that OSHA 
inspections lead to a reduction in injuries;  and Gray  (1986)  for evidence that 
both OSHA and EPA enforcement actions were directed toward industries with 
more problems  (higher  injury rates or more emissions). 
5.  The steel industry can be roughly split into two categories:  integrated 
firms and minimill firms.  Unless otherwise stated,  all references to the 
steel industry are references to the integrated firms. 
6.  "The iron and steel industry ... may be responsible for as much as 10 
percent of all particulate air emissions  ..."  Congressional Budget Office, 
1987,  p. 43. 
7.  See Crandall (1983),  and Gollup and Roberts (1985),  and references cited 
therein.  See also Gray  (1986,  1987) for evidence that industries facing a lot 
of enforcement actions tended to have lower productivity growth. 
1 I  8.  When Bethlehem Steel decided to shut its Lackawanna, N.Y.,  plant, idling 
7,300,  Lackawanna authorities began planning layoffs of fire and police and 
other government workers:  half the municipal budget came from Bethlehem's $6 
million in taxes."  David Nyhan,  "Crisis in Steel and for a Way of Life," 
Boston Globe, page 1 and ff.  , 1/30/83. 
9.  In addition to considering local adjustment costs,  regulators might 
avoid enforcement at a plant that was going to close  (a)  to avoid bad 
publicity if it appeared that the enforcement contributed to  the.plant 
closing,  or  (b)  because they might decide that forcing a firm to spend 
millions on pollution control at a plant that will soon close is senseless 
(and  perhaps impossible). 
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Best available copy10.  Other things being equal, a plant with an older capital stock is more 
likely to be closed than a plant with a newer capital stock simply because 
major reinvestment decisions should arise in the former first  (Stigler, 1966). 
This effect will be exaggerated,  of course, if newer capital is more 
efficient. 
11.  The area unemployment rate is not included in'the other two equations 
because it varies substantially during the sample  (so  the 1976 value would not 
pick up cross-sectional differences) and may be affected if the plant is 
closed during the period  (so  the average unemployment during the sample might 
not be exogenous). 
12.  All variables with names beginning with L  are measured in logs. 
13.  The amount of enforcement carried out varies from year to year,  as 
enforcement budgets change,  from state to state, due to differing state 
policies, and within states over time, as state policies evolve. 
14.  See Deily  (1988)  for a detailed description of the model,  and for 
evidence that firm characteristics,  such as size or extent of diversification, 
played little or no role in determining which plants closed in this industry. 
15.  Plants producing mainly specialty steels are excluded, as are small 
electric-arc-based plants. 
16.  All of the EPA data sets that we use have the plant as the unit of 
observation, and identify the name, street address,  city,  county,  state,  and 
industry of the plant.  We used this information to find the records belonging 
to plants in our sample. 
17.  All plants in the sample would qualify for entry into CDS "Class Al" 
sources,  emitting over 100 tons of pollutants per year. 
18.  For the estimations reported in this paper,  we treated all reported 
enforcement actions equally.  We did,  however,  attempt to identify "serious" 
enforcement actions,  based on  the brief description of the action provided in 
the CDS.  These actions included inspections,  notices of violation,  emissions 
tests,  penalties, and enforcement orders,  and they made up 48.7 percent of the 
actions in the sample  (4,539 of 9,316  actions).  The results using only 
"serious" actions are similar to those using all actions. 
19.  The tapes also have data for the years 1982,  1985 and 1986,  giving us a 
total of four possible years on which to base our measure of compliance.  We 
chose to use the earlier 1981 data because by 1985-1986 several of the plants 
are "in compliance" solely by virtue of being completely shut down. 
20.  There were two plants for which no emissions data were available.  They 
were given the predicted value from a regression of log(tota1  emissions) on 
log(capacity),  log(employment),  log(new  capital) and EARC  (a  dummy for 
electric-arc furnaces,  which produce much less pollution).  The R2 of this 
regression  (for  the other 47 plants) is  .62. 
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to  bring each particular plant into compliance;  the costs of operating the 
equipment are not included.  The two figures are highly correlated,  however. 
22.  We use county rather that SMSA measures because, while all plants are in 
a county,  not all are in an SMSA. 
23.  Perhaps the concentration of  steel plants in a few high-unemployment 
states is part of the answer, but note that including state dummies or state 
unemployment rates does not affect the result. 
24.  Firms may be avoiding part of these costs by buying coke instead of 
producing it in their own coke ovens,  which represent a major portion of 
pollution control expenditures.  Imports of coke have increased during the 
1980s. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyTable 1 
Means and Standard Deviations 
VARIABLE  Enforcement  Plant  -Closing 









1  SHAPES 
CLOSE 
COMPLY 
I  LENF 
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PCOMPLY 
PLENFSUM 
Table 1 (Cont'd) 
Means and Standard Deviations 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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First Stage Estimationsa 









ADJUSTED R-SQUARED:  0.43 
F-STATISTIC:  17.07 
LL:  - - 
CORRECT PREDICTIONS:  - - 
N  :  412 
a~tandard  errors are in parentheses. 
b~stirnated  equation included 10-  year dummies. 
*Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyTable  3 
Second Stage ~stimations~ 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LENF 
INTERCEPT  -1.90** 
(1.00) 





PCOMPLY  -0.07 
(0.76) 
ADJ  R-SQ:  0.46 
F-  STAT:  12.14 
N  :  412 
a~tandard  errors are in parentheses. 
b~stimated  equation included 10-  year dummies and 14 state dummies. 
'~stimated equation included 10-year dummies. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level.  .. - 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
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Second Stage Estimations: plant-closing and compliancea 









LL:  -18.29 
CORRECT PREDICTION:  88% 
N  :  49 
a~tandard  errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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